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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KEN HOLM and GLEN STEED
d/b/a H & S ENTERPRISES,
a partnership,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Civil No. 18067
vs.
B & M SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiffs
recover

damages

filed

for

this

allegedly

action

against

negligently

defendant

damaging

to

plaintiffs'

personal property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was granted on the grounds
that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs' claim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents

seek

affirmance

of

the

district

court's

Order dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs'

Complaint

alleges

that

on

June

30,

1978,

defendant negligently damaged plaintiffs' steel pipe when hauling
it

away

from

an

ace ident

scene

at

the

request of the

highway
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Plaintiffs'

patrol.

Complaint was

the district court for
after

the

Complaint on

in

Salt Lake County, more than three years
The

accident.

filed on August 5, 1981,

the grounds

district
that

court dismissed

the Complaint was

plaintiffs'

barred by the

applicable Utah statute of limitations.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE UTAH STATUTE IS CLEAR ON ITS FACE
AND UNEQUIVOCALLY BARS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-26 sets forth those civil
actions which must be commenced within three years.

Subsection

(2) provides as follows:
( 2) an action for taking, detaining or
injuring personal property, including actions
for specific recovery thereof; provided, that
in all cases where the subject of the action
is a domestic animal usually included in the
term 'livestock, ' having upon it at the time
of the loss a recorded mark or brand, if such
animal had strayed or was stolen from the true
owner without his fault, the cause shall not
be deemed to have accrued until the owner has
actual knowledge of such facts as would put a
reasonable
man
upon
inquiry
as
to
the
possess ion
thereof
by
the
defendant.
(Emphasis added.)
Unquestionably, the instant case is "an action for •
injuring personal property."

Appellants do not contest that the

steel

"personal

pipe

in

question

was

alleged damage was "injury" thereto.

property"

and

that

the

It is equally clear that a

complaint of negligence is "an action."

"An action," in absence

of any restrictive words, is a broad generic term with comprehensive

application,

and

includes
-

any

judicial

proceeding

which

2 -
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could

result

in

a

judgment.

3 3 2 , 212 P • 110 9 at 1110

See,

Dinsmore v. Barker,

61 Utah

There is no limitation in the

( 19 2 3 ) •

statute on the phrase "an action" which would justify the contention, made by appellants, that the statute refers to intentional
torts only, and not negligence.
"injuring" must be read
detaining."
statute

If

should

the

Appellants argue that the word

in conjunction with the words

Legislature had

have

been

worded

intended
"an

this

action

detaining and injuring personal property."

"taking,

result,

for

taking

the
or

To read the statute

as appellants suggest would lead to the absurd conclusion that
the statute applies only where the taking or detaining property
results in damage to the property, but would not apply to someone
who took personal property but did not damage it.

The only way

to reasonably read the statute is that it applies to any action
involving taking personal property, detaining personal property,

"2£" damaging personal property.

If the Legislature had intended

to limit the statute strictly to

intentional torts, or to just

taking or detaining personal property, they could have easily so
provided.
Appellants contend that the applicable statute is Utah
Code Ann. Section 78-12-25{2), which provides a four year limitation

for

law."
which

"an

action

for

relief

not otherwise

provided

for

by

As has been seen, however, the present case is an action ·
is otherwise provided for by law.

The four year statute

does apply to negligence actions for personal injuries (which are
not otherwise provided

for

by

law),

but no personal injury
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is

involved in the instant case.

Appellants contend, however, that

inasmuch as personal property damage and personal injury may both
be involved in some of the same cases, the same four year statute
should

Of

apply.

concluded

from

this

course,
logic

it

could

that

the

just

as

three year

reasonably

be

statute should

apply to negligence actions where both property damage and personal injury are

involved in the same case.

If there is any

merit in appellants' argument it should be made to the Legislature,

which

establishes

various classes of cases.

the

statute

of

limitations

for

the

The advantage of the present statutory

scheme is it provides for one period of limitations applicable to
damage to personal property, regardless of the theory under which
the suit is brought.
There is perhaps no better cannon of statutory interpretation than where language is clear and unambiguous it must be
held to mean that which it plainly expresses.

Utah's three year

statute of limitations clearly applies to negligence actions for
injury to personal property.
POINT II
THE APPLICABLE CASE LAW COMPELS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN APPLYING THE THREE YEAR STATUTE
The cases which· discuss the statute before the Court on
th is ·appeal can only be reasonably read as interpreting the statute as

including all tortious

personal

property.

question

is

contained

The
in

best

(including negligent)
discussion

of

the

damage to
statute

in

Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative v.
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Utah Ice & Storage Co.,

187 F.2d 652

(10th Cir. 1951).

In that

case, the plaintiff brought suit alleging that the defendant had
negligently damaged a large quantity of eggs.

The U.S. District

Court, District of Utah, dismissed the action as being barred by
the three year statute of limitations.

The plaintiff appealed on

the grounds that, although negligent injury of personal property
would

be barred by

the

three year

statute of limitations,

the

warehouse receipt constituted a contract and therefore the case
should

be

contracts.

controlled

by

the

statute

of

limitations

governing

Although the appellant court held that the action was

tortious in nature, it reasoned that the three year statute would
be applicable regardless of whether the action sounded in tort or
contract:
[IJt has been said that the statute is applicable whether the suit is brought on "a negligence theory or a breach of warranty theory."
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Union Oil Co., 85 Cal.
App. 2d 302, 193 P.2d 48, 51.
See also
Gosling v. Nichols, 59 Cal. App. 2d 442, 139
P.2d 86; Lowe v. Ozmun, 137 Cal. 257, 70 P.
8 7; Nathan v. Locke, 108 Cal. App. 158, 28 7 P.
550, 291.P. 286.
In speaking of the applicability of this statute, tl;le Supreme Court of
Utah in Reese v. Qualtrough, said "if the
injuries are to personal property, the statute
fixes the time within which such an action
must be brought, and the name of the action
can have no effect upon the question of what
statute controls."
156 P. at 959.
See also
Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden, 112 Utah fil, --ra8°
P.2d 995e
Speaking of an identical statute,
the
Idaho Supreme Court in Common School
District No. 18 v. Twin Falls Bank & Trust
Co.,
52 Idaho 200, 12 P.2d 774, 775, stated:
The statute says 'an action.'
It does not
place the limitation upon an act ion in tort,
but upon any action based upon a wrongful
taking, detaining, or injuring of goods or
chattels • • • • "
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In speaking of the immateriality of the
"form of action' to which the statute is
applicable, we think the courts undoubtedly
used that term in its generic sense to denote
a claim for relief on· any legal basis.
~
Dinsmore v. Barker, 61 Utah 332, 212 P. 1109.
Certainly, there is nothing in the statute
indicating a legislative purpose to cut off
remedies for tortious injuries to personal
property, while making it inapplicable to
remedies
for
injuries
resulting
from
the
breach of contract.
To so construe the statute would lead to an anomalous situation,
with both a three year and a six year limitation applying to the same act ion, depending
merely upon the form in which the pleader
chose to cast his complaint.
See Common
School District No. 18 v. Twin Falls-Bank &
Trust Co., 52 Idaho 200, 12 P.2d 774, at page
776.
Id. at 653-54.
The Utah Supreme Court also discussed an identical predecessor statute in Reese v. Qualtrough, 156 P.
that

case,

plaintiff

plaintiff's fish.

alleged

that

the

955

{1916).

defendant

In

destroyed

Defendant argued that the action was barred by

the three year statute of limitations, but plaintiff, as in the
instant case, argued that the four year statute was applicable.
The court concluded that it did not make any difference what the
action in which relief is sought is called:
It is the wrongful acts which result in
injury and damage which give the right of
action, and,
if the injuries are to personal
property, this statute fixes the time within
which such an action must be brought, and the
name of the action can have no effect upon the
question of what statute controls.
Id. at 959 (emphasis added).
The Reese case has been cited as authority for reaching
the same conclusion in other jurisdictions.

~'

Common School
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District No. 18 v. Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co.,
(Idaho

1932);

Deetz v. Cobbs & Mitchell Co.,

12
253

P.2d

774

542

(Or.

P.

19 27) •
It is significant to note that appellant cites no cases,
either in Utah or in another jurisdiction, which holds that this
statute, or one like it, does not apply to negligent damage to
In O'Neal v. San Pedro L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 38

personal property.
Utah 475,

114 P.

pp.

the

4-5),

127

(1911)

plaintiff

railroad track adjoining

(discussed in Appellants'

alleged
h~s

that

defendants

Brief at

constructed

a

property and the movement of trains

thereon damaged his real property.

The defendant argued that the

action was barred under a predecessor statute to Utah Code Ann.
Section 78-12-26(1)

wherein an action was barred if not brought

within three years "f6r waste or trespass of real property."

The

present statute provides a three year statute of limitations for
"an

action

property."

for

waste,

or

trespass

(Emphasis added.)

upon

or injury to

real

The court held that the action did

not involve "trespass" but was what was called at common law an
"action on the case" and therefore the three year statute concerning trespass
is

easily

to real property was not applicable.

distinguishable

from

the

instant

case

The case

because

the

instant case does not involve real property and the precedessor
statute involved in O'Neal made no reference to "injury to real
property."
105

P.

166

The case of Welch v. Seattle & M.R. Co., 56 Wash. 97,
(1909)

(discussed

in

Appellants'

Brief

at

p.

15),

involves the same distinction between an action for trespass and
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an action on the case, where there was one limitation period for
waste or trespass to real property, and another limitation period
applicable to actions otherwise provided
held to include an action on the case.
Hey, 24 N.E.2d 644

(Mass. 1939)

for

by law, which was

The court in Dearden v.

(discussed in Appellants' Brief

at p. 6), in fact notes that Massachusetts has a different limitations period for negligence actions for damage to personal property and negligence actions for
The case involves a

res

personal injury.

Id. at 646.

jud ica ta issue, and does not challenge

the distinction in the limitations period.
CONCLUSION
The
question,

and

only
the

reasonable
cases

interpretation

which

have

of

discussed

the
it,

statute
compels

in
the

conclusion that the statute bars a negligence action for damage
to personal property if not commenced within three years after
the cause of action has accrued.

Accordingly, the district court

was correct is dismissing this case and the dismissal should be
affirmed.
CHRIS~S~, JENSEN & PO~ELL

By

Utd~M----

Dale J. r{cimbert
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
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